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The Problem with Free Press Absolutism
SONJA R. WEST*
n March 3, 1993, James Perry brutally murdered three people.' He
shot Mildred Horn multiple times through the eyes, strangled her
8-year-old quadriplegic son, and shot and killed the boy's nurse.
Perry was a contract killer, and Horn's ex-husband had hired him to
murder his family so that he could inherit his son's $2 million trust fund.
In preparation for the triple murder, Perry relied heavily on the
detailed killing instructions and unapologetic encouragement found in two
books: Hit Man: A Technical Manual for Independent Contractors and How to
Make a Disposable Silencer, Vol. II, both published by Paladin Enterprises. 2
The victims' families sued Paladin for aiding and abetting the wrongful
deaths of their loved ones.3
One would assume that a publisher of such shockingly unethical and
harmful books would have few friends in the courtroom. Yet there was one
group who did advocate in favor of Paladin -the mainstream news media.
A group of prominent and respected news organizations including The
New York Times, The Washington Post, ABC, Inc., the National Association of
Broadcasters, the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, and the
Society of Professional Journalists filed an amicus brief in support of
Paladin. 4
Deciding the case against the publisher, Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals Judge Michael Luttig expressed bafflement that such reputable
members of the press would support Paladin.5 He stated:
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. I am grateful for the
research assistance of our Faculty Research Librarian, T.J. Striepe.
1 See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 1997).
2 See id. at 241.
3 See id.
4 Id. at 233.
5 Id. at 265.
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That the national media organizations would feel obliged to
vigorously defend Paladin's assertion of a constitutional right to
intentionally and knowingly assist murderers with technical
information which Paladin admits it intended and knew would
be used immediately in the commission of murder and other
crimes against society is, to say the least, breathtaking.6
The news organizations, however, were unyielding: the rights of
publishers on the periphery of the First Amendment, such as Paladin, must
be defended in order to ensure the security of speakers at its core. Or, as
the media amici wrote in support of certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court, "it is most often the speech at the fringes of American life that
defines the freedoms for those at the center." 7
The press's advocacy on behalf of an unseemly speaker like Paladin
Publishing is not unusual. Major news media organizations have a long
history of coming to the defense of a number of speakers whose role in our
public debate appears to have little in common with the journalistic work
of newsgathering and reporting. News media advocates in recent years, for
example, have provided legal support for the makers of animal cruelty
videos,8 a man convicted of falsely claiming to have earned military
honors, 9 political propagandists, 10 an anti-gay church that routinely
protested at military funerals, a student who held up a sign reading "Bong
Hits 4 Jesus,"" and a conspiracy theorist who believed President and
Hillary Clinton murdered their deputy counsel and engaged in a cover-
up.'2 They have chimed in, moreover, even in cases where the regulations
at issue included express exceptions for the news media. 13
6 Id.
7 Brief for ABC Inc. et al. as Amid Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Paladin Enterprises v.
Rice, 523 U.S. 1074 (1998) (No. 97-1325), 1997 WL 33549427.
8 See Brief for The Reporters Comm. for the Freedom of the Press et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent, United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (No. 08-769), 2009 WL
2219305.
9 See Brief for The Reporters Comm. for the Freedom of the Press et al. as Amid Curiae
Supporting Respondent, United States v. Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. 2537 (2012) (No. 11-210), 2012 WL
249640.
1 0 See Brief for The Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellants, Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (No.
08-205), 2009 WL 132714.
11 See Brief for the Student Press Law Center et al. as Amid Curiae Supporting Respondent,
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007) (No. 06-278), 2009 WL 542417.
12 See Brief for The Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press et al. as Amid Curiae
Supporting Respondent, Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157 (2004) (No.
02-954), 2003 WL 22038397.
13 See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 465 (2010).
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While many of these cases undeniably raise issues that could directly
affect the work of traditional journalists, the loyalties of the press typically
go well beyond its own self-interest and seek to protect virtually all
speakers. Indeed, the traditional modus operandi of journalists and their
lawyers is to demand nothing short of what I refer to as "free press
absolutism."
In her important new book, The First Amendment Bubble, Professor Amy
Gajda exposes the many dangers of this all-encompassing attitude about
constitutional rights for the press. Sure, there may have been a time when
the news media could demand- and the courts and public would grant-
near immunity for their work, making free press absolutism relatively
costless. Yet Gajda provides example after example demonstrating that the
courts no longer give the media a free pass.14 And as the public and the
courts' opinions about the press change, Gajda warns, the news media's
thinking about their legal protections must change as well.'5 In place of free
press absolutism, Gajda says, journalists must make "hard choices,"
specifically about "the ways that they define themselves and their craft." 16
In her book, Gajda persuasively makes the argument that the rise of
"quasi-journalism" is a core threat to the amount and kind of legal press
protections that courts will be willing to enforce.1 7 Journalists can no longer
rely on their standby approach of "seeking to extend the boundaries of
press rights to cover an ever-expanding universe of bloggers, activists, web
merchants, provocateurs, and other quasi-journalistic publishers." 18 She
suggests that in such times, journalists must sacrifice the breadth of their
protections in order to achieve a more limited, but more sustainable, legal
standing.
In this Essay, I go a step further and submit that even in the "best of
times" with the most press-friendly courts, the news media need not, and
should not, espouse an "all for one and one for all" mantra when it comes
to press freedoms. By adopting this overly zealous attitude, the press has
hurt its own cause both legally, by weakening its argument for more
expansive press rights, and also reputationally, by aligning themselves
with disreputable speakers. This stubborn refusal to separate press from
non-press speakers, moreover, leads to an underemphasis of the public
benefits of the press's work and an overemphasis of its harms. Adopting
the absolute principle that all speakers are the same, therefore, threatens to
14 AMY GAJDA, THE FIRST AMENDMENT BUBBLE: How PRIVACY AND PAPARAZZI THREATEN A
FREE PRESS 50-51 (2015).
15 See id. at 86-87.
16 Id. at 223.
17 Id. at 229-30.
18 Id. at 224.
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limit the public's access to important information by failing to recognize
that journalism, as Gajda describes it, "is special, important, and basically
good."' 9
Journalists have long and proudly embraced the idea that they have
assumed the mantle of defender of First Amendment rights for all.20 While
press critics often accuse the news media of demanding special rights and
protections not granted to the general public, the media's actual court
filings tell a different story.21 In a close study of almost forty years of
Supreme Court cases, Professor Erik Ugland found that media litigants
have consistently rejected a "special rights" framework.22 Rather, they have
actively scorned legal arguments that distinguish the mainstream press
from more fringe press entities or press speakers from the general public.23
In fact, Ugland found, "they have been more diligent than the Court in
avoiding arguments that separate speech and press and that imply the
need for unusual scrutiny of restraints targeting media defendants." 24 Even
when press litigants did advance legal arguments that made distinctions
between speech and press, or between the press and other speakers,
Ugland found that "they linked their claims to an egalitarian conception of
the press in which the distinctions among communicators were made on
the basis of function, not identity." 25
Thus, the news media (usually newspapers) have fought vigorously for
broad legal rights that served not only their interests but everyone's. 26 In a
variety of legal contexts, from constitutional protections to statutory rights,
it was the news media who "led the charge" for expansive and inclusive
laws.27 As former New York Times Supreme Court reporter Linda
Greenhouse explained, the press:
19 Id. at 223.
20 See Advocacy, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF JOURNALISTS AND AUTHORS, http://www.asja.org/
about/advocacy/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2016).
21 Erik Ugland, Newsgathering, Autonomy, and the Special-Rights Apocrypha: Supreme Court
and Media Litigant Conceptions of Press Freedom, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 375,380 (2009).
22 Id.
23 See id. at 418-20.
24 Id. at 380.
25 Id. at 421.
26 See Enrique J. Gimenez, Who Watches the Watchdogs?: The Status of Newsgathering Torts
Against the Media in Light of the Food Lion Reversal, 52 ALA. L. REV. 675,676-77 (2001).
27 RonNel Andersen Jones, Litigation, Legislation, and Democracy in a Post-Newspaper
America, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 557,570-571 (2011).
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sees itself as the embattled defender of the constitutional
guarantees of free speech and freedom of the press. Each
affront to those guarantees, serious or slight, is immediately
seized as fresh evidence that the country is forsaking the ideals
of the founding fathers and that the First Amendment itself
is in peril.28
For its part, the United States Supreme Court agrees that the press and
the public are a package deal. 29 The Court has "consistently rejected the
proposition that the institutional press has any constitutional privilege
beyond that of other speakers."3 The Court also has claimed repeatedly
that "[t]he guarantees of the First Amendment broadly secure the rights of
every citizen" and it does not "create special privileges for particular
groups or individuals."3 Based on this approach, the Court has held that
the press has no additional rights of access to government information and
places than the general public, 32 nor does it enjoy any special immunity for
criminal or tort violations.33 When the Court has held in favor of the press,
such as finding a constitutional right of access to criminal trials34 or a
heightened protection for defamatory statements made about public
officials,35 it does so by granting the right to all speakers.
The problem is that the press is different - significantly different - from
other types of speakers. And the courts know it. When the Supreme Court
talks about the press, it does so with a rhetoric that recognizes the press's
distinctiveness from the general public.B6 But more importantly, the Court
has frequently recognized that the press has a unique and "historic, dual
responsibility in our society." 37 That dual responsibility is to gather and
disseminate news to the public and provide a check on the government
28 Linda Greenhouse, Books of The Times Embattled Defender? N.Y. TIMES (July 4, 1981),
http://www.nytimes.com/1981/07/04/books/books-of-the-times-embattled-defender.html.
29 But see Sonja R. West, The Stealth Press Clause, 48 GA. L. REV. 729 (2014) (arguing that the
Court has implicitly treated the press differently than other speakers).
30 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 352 (2010) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted); accord Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S.
652, 691 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("We have consistently rejected the proposition that the
institutional press has any constitutional privilege beyond that of other speakers.").
31 Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 857 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting).
32 Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974).
33 Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132 (1937) (noting that the press receives "no
special immunity from the application of general laws").
34 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 558 (1980).
35 See N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283-84 (1964).
36 West, supra note 29, at 746-49.
37 FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 382 (1984) (describing the dual
responsibilities as "reporting information and... bringing critical judgment to bear on public
affairs").
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and the powerful. 38 These specific and unique press functions can be
compared with the discussion of general speech values, which run the
gamut from furthering truth-seeking to enabling individual self-
realization.39 These differing purposes between press and speech explain
why speech has been found to protect decidedly non-press actions such as
music, dance, art, video games, and non-verbal communication.
In many cases, the goals of all speakers-press and non-press alike-
overlap. But in numerous others, they diverge. We see this separation most
clearly in cases involving the pre-speech activity of information gathering. 40
It is here that the media's embrace of free press absolutism has been the
most damaging to its self-interest. This is because newsgathering often
involves situations in which the press needs rights or protections in order
to fulfill its duties that are simply not practicable to give to everyone.
In contemplating its continued support for free press absolutism, the
press should learn from the fall of its sister-theory, free speech absolutism.
Much like free press absolutism, free speech absolutism is very appealing
in the abstract. Speech absolutism provides a constitutionally
overprotective approach that embraces the maximum number of speakers
and messages. It further offers a bright-line rule that keeps the government
out of the messy business of line-drawing. But much like speech
absolutism, press absolutism fails by offering only one answer to a variety
of complex questions.
Perhaps this is why, despite the unequivocality of the First
Amendment's text, there are few legal thinkers who have embraced the
notion that the freedom of speech is absolute. Even the earliest advocates
for broad free speech rights knew there had to be limits. The most famous
example (if arguably not the best example) 41 of why all speech cannot be
protected is Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's suggestion that even the
"most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in
38 West, supra note 29, at 750 (stating that a review of Supreme Court precedent about the
press reveals that the press has two primary constitutional functions).
39 See, e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877, 878-79 (1963) (arguing that freedom of speech furthers four main values induding being
necessary "(1) as assuring individual self-fulfillment, (2) as a means of attaining the truth, (3)
as a method of securing participation by the members of the society in social, induding
political, decision-making, and (4) as maintaining the balance between stability and change in
the society").
40 Comment, The Right of the Press to Gather Information After Branzburg and Pell, 124 U. PA.
L. REV. 166, 181-91 (1976).
41 WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 38 (1984)
(suggesting that shouting "Fire!" in a crowded theater would be protected if the audience
members were all deaf and watching a movie with subtitles).
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falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing a panic." 42 By 1942, the Court
stated that "the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under
all circumstances." 43
Two Supreme Court justices, Justice Hugo Black and Justice William
Douglas, made the most gallant effort to apply an absolutist approach to
speech cases. Indeed, Justice Black declared repeatedly his confidence in
absolutism, stating that the Constitution "'absolutely' forbids such laws
without any 'ifs' or 'buts' or 'whereases." ' 44 Yet Black and Douglas never
managed to convince their colleagues that absolutism was feasible or
desirable. The other justices saw that there were a variety of speech cases in
which some regulation was needed in order to avoid great harm.45 These
included perjury, child pornography, incitement of criminal activity,
leaking of national security secrets, threats, defamation, copyright
violations, and so on. As Dean Rodney Smolla has explained, absolutism
ultimately failed "largely because it is simply too brittle to account for the
many 'irresistible counterexamples' for which some accounting must be
made."46
Treating unlike speech alike leads to problems of both over- and
under-inclusiveness. Some speech that has low public value and causes
great harm is protected, while other speech is not protected even though it
has great public value and few harmful effects. Justice Black's experiment
with absolutism demonstrates this well. According to Justice Black, while
government cannot regulate speech, it can regulate conduct. 47 Thus, when
he concluded that a law was "directly aimed at curtailing speech," he was
42 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47,52 (1919).
I do not doubt for a moment that by the same reasoning that would
justify punishing persuasion to murder, the United States constitutionally
may punish speech that produces or is intended to produce a clear and
imminent danger that it will bring about forthwith certain substantive
evils that the United States constitutionally may seek to prevent.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
43 Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942).
44 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 275 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting); see also Columbia
Broad. Sys. Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 156 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(stating that "[tihe ban of 'no' law that abridges freedom of the press is in my view total and
complete").
45 See Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 254-56.
46 Rodney A. Smolla, Content and Context: The Contributions of William Van Alstyne to First
Amendment Interpretation, 54 DUKE L.J. 1623, 1632 (2005).
47 See HUGO BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 53 (1968) ("In giving absolute protection to
free speech, however, I have always been careful to draw a line between speech and
conduct.").
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steadfast in his belief that it was unconstitutional. 48 This led him to vote
against any regulation of speech, even if it was arguably of low value and
caused great societal harm including obscenity, defamation, 49 and
unauthorized disclosure of national security information.5s
But when Justice Black concluded that the law in question was "aimed
at conduct and indirectly affect[ed] speech," he was far more willing to
uphold the regulation.5 1 In such cases, he frequently gave great weight to
countervailing interests such as private and government property rights
and privacy. He thus voted to uphold government regulation of speech
that was arguably high-value "core" political speech such as protests
against the arrests of racial segregation demonstrators, 2 students wearing
black armbands to protest the Vietnam War,5 3 flag burning,54 and Paul
Robert Cohen's famous "fuck the draft" jacket.55
Justice Black's critics rightfully complained that his absolutism resulted
in legal protections that were just as-if not more-subjective than other
types of balancing approaches.5 6 The definitional question of determining
whether an act was primarily speech or primarily conduct gave judges
great discretion. Likewise, by recognizing countervailing interests to
speech, such as the rights of others to privacy, property, or tranquility,
Justice Black was still making key value choices. One of his outspoken
critics, James J. Magee, declared Justice Black to be an "undisguised ...
balancer."57
Free press absolutism, as I discuss it here, raises many similar,
although not identical, issues. Both forms of absolutism struggle with a
definitional problem-either how to determine what is speech (as opposed
to conduct) or who is the press (as opposed to other speakers). In both
48 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 142 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
49 See N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting) (advocating that the
First Amendment protected an "unconditional right to say what one pleases about public
affairs" regardless of whether statements were made with actual malice).
50 See N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 719 (1971) (Black, J., concurring) ("The
guarding of military and diplomatic secrets at the expense of informed representative
government provides no real security for our Republic.").
51 BLACK, supra note 47 at 61 (emphasis added).
52 See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47-48 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 575
(1965) (Black, J., concurring).
53 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 525-26 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting).
54 Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576,609-10 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting).
5s Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,27 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting).
56 See Sergey Tokarev, Absolutism and Free Speech, CIVIL LIBERTIES (Nov. 10, 2011, 2:29 PM),
http://uscivilliberties.org/themes/2977-absolutism-and-free-speech.html.
57 JAMES J. MAGEE, MR. JUSTICE BLACK: ABSOLUTIST ON THE COURT 183 (1980).
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cases, an absolutist approach ties the hands of the courts to recognize real-
world differences in the benefits and harms at stake and to structure the
rights for maximum public benefits.
In other articles, I have explained the differences between freedom of
speech and freedom of the press.58 Both historical evidence and Supreme
Court doctrine suggest that while our speech rights are broad and
ubiquitous, press freedoms should be reserved for those speakers who are
fulfilling the unique press functions of informing the public on
newsworthy matters and checking the government and the powerful.59 The
insistence that press speakers are no different than other types of speakers
works to limit-not expand-our ability to protect and empower these
unique constitutional actors. The result is a reduction in the amount of
information the public receives and a weakening of our ability to scrutinize
the government.
Like free speech absolutism, an absolutist approach to freedom of the
press risks being both over- and under-inclusive. Generally, I have focused
my attention in prior articles on the problem of the under-protection of
press speakers.60 If a right, once recognized, must be given to all, courts
become understandably cautious about embracing broad constitutional
protections.61 Yet some of these rights and protections are ones that the
press would use-and use effectively-for the greater public good. Non-
press speakers, on the other hand, might abuse such rights. Thus, when the
media fails to make the case that they need such protections in order to
further their public informant and government watchdog duties, then they
tend to lose. For example, judges have rationally concluded that we cannot
give all speakers a testimonial privilege;62 protection from search
warrants,63 access to government information,64 proceedings, 65 or places,66
58 See Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025 (2011) [hereinafter
Awakening the Press Clause]; Sonja R. West, The Stealth Press Clause, 48, 48 GA. L. REV. 729
(2014); Sonja R. West, Press Exceptionalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2434 (2014); Sonja R. West, The
"Press," Then & Now, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 49 (2016).
59 West, supra note 29, at 755-56.
6 I have discussed how courts could identify press speakers in more detail in my article.
Sonja R. West, Press Exceptionalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2434, 2437 (2014) (arguing that "press
speakers devote time, resources, and expertise to the vital constitutional tasks of informing the
public on newsworthy matters and providing a check on the government and the powerful").
61 See Awakening the Press Clause, supra note 58, at 1056-57 (describing this problem as the
"boomerang effect").
62 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682 (1972) (considering reporters' argument that
they should have testimonial privileges "because if forced to respond to subpoenas and
identify their sources or disclose other confidences, their informants will refuse or be reluctant
to furnish newsworthy information in the future").
63 See James S. Liebman, Search and Seizure of the Media: A Statutory, Fourth Amendment and
2016
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defenses to select tort or criminal liabilities such as fraud, 67 trespass68 or
eavesdropping;69 or safeguards against government seizure of mail or
phone records. 70 In these types of cases, where judges are given a choice
between granting a right for everyone or no one, they tend to choose no
one.
While under-protection of the press is a serious concern, Gajda's
arguments shine needed light on the harms of an overinclusive approach to
press freedoms as well. When we forbid drawing lines between different
types of speakers, we end up protecting speakers who are not acting as
watchdogs or conduits of information to the public. 71 Advocating for
everyone to receive press rights means, Gajda states, that "journalists must
necessarily welcome those quasi-journalists who today push the limits of
First Amendment protection into places where courts and legislators
would presumably never go."72 Because these quasi-journalists do not
follow the same ethical and professional standards as actual journalists,
they can do serious damage to the public and the courts' view of
journalism. The press, meanwhile, is left unable to take advantage of the
First Amendment Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REV. 957, 967 (1976).
64 Potter Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 636 (1974-75) ("The Constitution
itself is neither a Freedom of Information Act nor an Official Secrets Act.").
65 See, e.g., Soc'y of Prof'I Journalists v. Sec'y of Labor, 832 F.2d 1180, 1184-86 (10th Cir.
1987) (dismissing on mootness grounds a district court order stating that, while the press and
the public did not have a statutory right to cover a hearing by the Mine Safety and Health
Administration, they did have a constitutional right to do so).
6See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1978) (denying press access to jails
and prisons, and noting that "[n]either the First Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment
mandates a right of access to government information or sources of information within the
government's control").
67 See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 506 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating
that reporters are not immune from fraud, breach of duty of loyalty, and trespass claims).
68 Le Mistral, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 402 N.Y.S.2d 815 (App. Div. 1978) (upholding a
finding of liability against a television station after its news crew entered the property of a
restaurant that had been cited for health code violations).
69 See, e.g., Deteresa v. Am. Broad. Co., 121 F.3d 460, 472 (9th Cir. 1997); Dietemann v. Time,
Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249-50 (9th Cir. 1971); cf. Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469,
493 (Cal. 1998) (noting that an intrusion of privacy committed as part of newsgathering might
trigger some constitutional protections for the reporter).
70 Charlie Savage & Scott Shane, Justice Dept. Defends Seizure of Phone Records, N.Y TIMES
(May 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/15/us/politics/attomey-general-defends-
seizure-of-joumalists-phone-records.html.
71 Or, at least, speakers who are not fulfilling the functions with regularity. In a prior
article, I refer to these speakers as "occasional public commentators." See Awakening the Press
Clause, supra note 58, at 1070.
72 GADJA, supra note 14, at 245-46.
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reputational trust it is able to earn. The blurring of the line between
journalists and quasi-journalists can also lead journalists to see themselves
and their duties differently. Without the ability to self-identify as a unique
speaker, journalists are tempted to stoop to the levels of quasi-journalists.
Thus, Gadja says, "journalists must work against the perception-and, in
some cases, the reality-that the two have become one."73
The instinct behind the news media's embrace of free press absolutism
is a commendable one. Journalists are, by their nature, believers in the
value of more voices, the importance of equality, and the fear of
government power. Thus to media advocates, the idea of abandoning free
press absolutism amounts to legal blasphemy. But the warning cry of
Gajda's book suggests it is, indeed, time for the press to focus its fighting
power on winning its own legal battles and leave the others to protect
themselves.74
73 Id. at 246.
74 Id. at 249.
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